China has taken a new step in its pressure campaign on Taiwan, one that until now was only part of the rhetoric and that has become very real: the introduction for the first time of a military drone in its airspace, a brief incursion (just four minutes) but loaded with symbolism and unpredictable strategic intention.
The first time. What happened is reminiscent of what we had seen with Russia in Europe. The device, identified by Taiwanese sources as a WZ-7 reconnaissance aircraft, entered the air over Pratas/Dongsha, a small atoll controlled by Taipei in the South China Sea, and did so at an altitude deliberately out of reach of the island’s available defenses, leaving after Taiwan issued international radio warnings.
The maneuver seems to reveal a classic pattern of controlled escalation: Beijing is not seeking an immediate clash, but rather to normalize the fact that it can violate Taiwanese sovereignty without suffering tactical consequences, forcing Taipei to accept the violation as routine or to react in a way that could be presented as a provocation.
Pratas as a weak point. Pratas is a perfect target for this type of test because it combines symbolic value and military fragility: it is about 400 kilometers south of Taiwan, in an area through which American and Chinese submarines would transit in a crisis scenario, and in recent months it had already been harassed by Chinese coast guard and maritime militias, that hybrid arm that operates on the border between civil and paramilitary.
There, Taiwan maintains minimal defenses (there is talk of short-range systems like Avenger or portable missiles) that serve for low and close threats, not for a high-altitude drone, which turns each incursion into a demonstration of impunity. Furthermore, the problem for Taipei is that this type of movement opens up a dangerous ladder. Tomorrow it may be repeated, but the drone may go down a little further and force a decision whether to shoot it down or tolerate it, and if it is shot down when it is finally within reach, Beijing can use it as a political excuse, arguing that Taiwan “escalated” a situation that it had previously accepted.

A Wz 7 drone
The unpredictable factor. The Financial Times recalled that what is disturbing is not so much the time the flight lasted, but what it trains: China’s ability to explore doctrinal gaps, measure reaction times, test alert communications and, above all, introduce uncertainty about what each party considers a “first strike.”
Taiwan has long warned that any unauthorized entry of military assets into its waters or airspace can be interpreted as an initial attack that enables a response, but its own rules of engagement are still being refined to decide who, when and under what circumstances can order an action that could trigger a further escalation. From that prism, Pratas functions as a laboratory: a place sensitive enough to hitbut remote enough and defended with tweezers so that each decision is a balance between firmness and restraint.
The choreography around. The incursion also comes in a context of accumulated pressure, with increasingly frequent exercises and closer to the island of Taiwan, and with a constant pulse in the strait that combines military maneuvers, US weapons packages and Chinese responses in the form of live fire or more aggressive patrols. That backdrop turns a drone into something more: a message that Beijing not only intimidates with large deployments, but can wear down daily with small, cheap and difficult to answer actions.
At the same time, the United States’ role adds ambiguity: Washington is committed to helping Taiwan defend itself and maintain the ability to resist pressure, but even within that framework there is doubt about how far it would go if something catches fire, reinforcing the Chinese temptation to apply pressure just where the allied response might be less automatic.
The new threshold. China presents it as a “legitimate and legal” exercise, but precisely that narrative is part of the change: if it is accepted that these incursions are normal, a precedent is opened that erodes sovereignty without the need to occupy or shoot, and that prepares the ground for more dangerous scenarios.
In other words, if Beijing repeats and deepens this tactic, it may force Taiwan to choose between normalizing the incursions or a risky response, and in that margin of doubt (where no one “wants to be first”) is where strategic pressure is most effective.
Imagen | CCTV, Infinty 0
In WorldOfSoftware | China’s new futuristic drone is already flying alongside the J-20 fighters. And Beijing has shown it without saying a word
In WorldOfSoftware | One of China’s most disturbing weapons already has a flight date: a huge mother drone with 100 kamikaze drones on board
