“A Discussion on the Defense Department’s 2024 China Military Power Report”
Conducted Wednesday, Dec. 18, 2024
Bonny Lin: Hey, folks, I think we’re just two minutes late, so pretty on time. But really delighted that you’re here with us this afternoon. And I’m very honored to be hosting two distinguished guests from the Department of Defense to roll out this year’s China Military Power Report from the Department of Defense.
I want to save as much time for both Ely and Mike, so let me introduce the two of them. They actually need no introduction, but I’ll just give very short bios. And then I’ll turn the floor to both of them to discuss the main findings from the report. But also, we’ll have about 15 minutes near the end for Q&A. We’ll take the first round of questions from the room and then we’ll look at if there are any questions online.
So with that, Dr. Ely Ratner serves as the assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs. Prior to that, he served as a director of the DOD China Task Force and as senior advisor to China to the secretary of Defense. Before arriving at DOD, he was the executive vice president and director of studies at the Center for New American Security, where he was a member of the executive team and responsible for managing the center’s research agenda and staff.
Next to Ely is Dr. Mike Chase. He became the deputy assistant secretary of defense for China in February 2021, and assumed the responsibilities for Taiwan and Mongolia in October 2022. He was previously a senior political scientist at RAND, where his research focused on Chinese military modernization, China’s approach to strategic deterrence, Taiwan’s defense policy, and Indo-Pacific security issues. I was very honored to be able to work with Mike for many years. Prior to working at RAND, he was an associate professor at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, where he taught in the strategy and policy department and conducted research on Chinese maritime issues in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies.
OK, so with that out of the way, you may have seen already, for those who didn’t have a copy there are a couple of hard copies downstairs still. A very, very impressive report. Probably one of the most important reports you read – you can read from the year in terms of authoritative U.S. government assessment on China’s military power. So I guess the first question I have for Mike is, what’s new in the report and what should we be paying attention to?
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Michael Chase: All right. Thank you, Bonny, very much for hosting us today. And thanks to everyone for joining us.
In this year’s report, I think there are a number of topics that are new and noteworthy. And also we continue, of course, to cover trends that have developed over a long period of time across the reports in this series over many years. We note that despite what the PRC sees as an increasingly turbulent strategic environment and domestic challenges, they continue to forge ahead with the pursuit of Xi Jinping’s national strategy and they continue to work toward his military modernization goals for the PLA including the capabilities development milestones he’s set for the PLA for 2027, 2035, and 2049.
So in the report we take note of the advances the PLA has made in its conventional capabilities, the modernization and expansion of its nuclear force, as well as the investments they’re making in space, cyberspace, and electronic warfare. But we also note a number of areas in which they continue to face challenges and in which they have some self-assessed long-standing deficiencies related to personnel quality, for example, and we have a new section in the report detailing the PLA challenges with corruption and the anti-corruption campaign that the PRC has waged very vigorously over the period that’s covered in the report.
We talk about the anti-corruption campaign – the corruption challenges themselves – and how they could present real obstacles to accomplishing the goals that Xi has set for the PLA for 2027.
We also talk about a number of other new topics in the report this year including the challenges that the PRC would have in the event of a conflict in the Western Pacific in securing its energy supplies and we cover a number of other new topics in the report or cover some topics of long-running interest in greater depth including the role of political training in the PLA, their approach to cognitive domain warfare, what we would think of as information or influence operations, among others.
Assistant Secretary of Defense Ely Ratner: Great. Well, thank you, Bonny. Let me also just say thanks to CSIS for being here today and congratulations to Bonny for all the great work you’re doing here at the center.
Mike mentioned a bunch of the specific topics, which I’m sure we’ll have time to get into. Maybe just a couple framing comments at the beginning which is just to remind folks that in the 2022 NDS the department identified the People’s Republic of China as the department’s pacing challenge, and since taking office the administration has reiterated time and again that the reason for that is because the PRC remains the only country in the world with both the will and increasingly the capability to alter the international order in its favor, and that even in the midst of significant global challenges, obviously, what’s happening with Russia and Ukraine, in the Middle East, that fundamental assessment of the PRC as the department’s pacing challenge has not changed.
And I think it’s really important in terms of continuity of strategy, and nothing we have seen from the PRC has changed that and I think this report tells you exactly why both in terms of articulating with some specificity both the strategy and the capability side of what we’re seeing out of the PLA.
So this document in many ways reaffirms existing assessment and strategy, and as we are talking about new elements there is that level of continuity throughout the administration. So that would be point number one.
I think point number two we’re going to spend most of today talking about the PLA but it is very important to remember if there was a foreign country writing a U.S. military power report what that report would say is that over the last several years the United States has substantially strengthened its strategic position in the Indo-Pacific, that we have taken that strategy that identified the PRC as the top pacing challenge, applied that to our budget – the most strategy-driven budgets in the department’s history.
So we are making the investments in our capability. We are taking actions to ensure that American wealth and American innovation are not flowing toward PLA modernization through export controls and investment restrictions.
We are modernizing our force posture. We are strengthening the capabilities of our allies and partners and we are bringing our allies and partners together in ways we never have before.
So I just don’t want us to lose sight of even as we are going to be talking about some of the advances that the PLA is making that on the U.S. side we are absolutely keeping pace, and we can get into that in more detail as well.
Dr. Lin: Great. Thank you, Ely. Thank you, Mike.
I want to follow up on a couple points that you touched on which is how China is investing across the board but also China’s military deficiencies and, I think, Mike, you mentioned one of them in passing, which is personnel and then corruption.
But I found it quite striking in the report that when it came to China’s investment in the military the assessment this year was that the actual Chinese defense budget is, what, 40 (percent) to 90 percent more than the public budget, and the figure from last year’s report was it was, like, only 30 (percent) to 40 percent more.
So very interesting in terms of the difference between this year’s report versus last year’s report so I’d love your sense on, like, how much is China investing, what is – where do you see the most significant investment and what are the areas of significant deficiency.
DASD Chase: Sure. So, of course, we tried to refine the estimates every year across all the categories and all the topics that we cover in the report. If that means adjusting the methodology or based on new data, we try to make sure that we’re coming to the most up-to-date, accurate conclusions we can, year to year. And this year we did find the report, as you suggested, that the true level of defense spending is probably about 40 to 90 percent higher. So just about one and a half to two times the published budget figures.
And that reflects investments in a range of capabilities that are focused on Taiwan contingencies, on the East or South China Seas. So, on operations relatively close to the PRC’s borders. But it also reflects investments in power projection capabilities, the kinds of things that we note in the report about the PLA Navy trying to improve its ability to operate out beyond the first island chain. And it reflects the longer-term ambition to really become a global military, with capabilities that can, from the PRC’s point of view, defend their interests worldwide.
So that’s, I think, where we see them investing. They are, as we note in the report, also investing a lot in their – undoubtedly, in their nuclear expansion and modernization, I think, in their space and counterspace capabilities. And we chronicled all those kind of developments over the course of the several years of the report that we’ve published while I’ve been there. And, of course, going back to now more than two decades of China Military Power Reports have tracked those kinds of advances and where they’re making their investments to try to achieve the goals that those priorities support.
But, as we highlight in the report, they do also face some long-standing shortcomings. And I mentioned personnel quality earlier. We noted in the report that PLA media includes a lot of references to what they call the five incapables. And that’s a slogan that they use to talk about some of the shortcomings that they perceive with their commanders. So those are – that they’re incapable, not necessarily all of them all the time, right, but I think that they’re suggesting that they still face shortcomings in terms of the ability of commanders to judge situations, understand higher authorities and tensions, make operational decisions, deploy forces, and especially to manage unexpected situations.
And so I think from the PRC’s perspective some of this derives from their lack of combat experience. We used to talk about the lack of recent combat experience. We’re going back now to 1979. So from PRC point of view it means that the experience that they do have is coming from the overseas operations, from the exercises that they conduct at home, not from any sort of real world experience with combat operations. And so they sometimes talk in their own literature about peace disease or about the lack of combat experience potentially being another source of those types of shortcomings.
So we see that also, despite these major investments, there are particular warfare areas related to major regional contingency in which they also continue to not yet be where they need to be, despite trying to make some improvements. And those include things like urban warfare and long-distance logistics. So while we’re tracking the investments that they’re making and the areas in which they’re improving, we’re also making sure that we’re paying close attention to the areas in which they still have some shortcomings or weaknesses that they’re trying to address.
Asst. Sec. Ratner: And just to – that was a great laydown. I think just the only things to add on would be, you know, thinking about that question broadly about potential vulnerabilities or deficiencies. And that’s important because that plays into the deterrence question as well. And, of course, there are some of the war fighting areas, urban warfare, some of these logistics, sustainment questions that are really important. I think a little more broadly, there’s the question of China’s energy vulnerabilities, which is something that’s highlighted in the report and, as far as I can tell, the PRC has no answer to at this point. And that’s significant.
And the other thing, just to get back to my earlier comment, there’s a dynamism to this, right? Because even as the PRC is modernizing and increasing its own capabilities, in many respects there are areas in which the United States is taking actions that is making those deficiencies or those vulnerabilities even more pronounced, even as the PLA modernizes. So they may be racing forward with military modernization, but finding themselves just as distant, if not more distant, from solving some of the operational problems they’re trying to solve. And that’s really the essence of the pacing challenge and the essence of deterrence.
And one of the reasons why we have some confidence, as we say, that we believe that invasion is neither imminent nor inevitable, that we believe deterrence is real, deterrence is strong. It’s going to take a lot of work to keep it that way, but as we look at these operational challenges that the PLA is seeking to resolve, to the extent that their particular goal is to be feeling ready and confident that they can execute a short, sharp invasion of Taiwan at acceptable costs, they’re not there today. They’re trying to get there. That’s what we’re seeing in much of this report. But it’s not clear they’re getting any closer than they were over the last couple of years.
Dr. Lin: And, Ely, to your point of China playing catchup or trying to expand its capabilities, I think nuclear is one area in which China is, as the report clearly shows, rapidly expanding but also still quite behind. I wanted to talk a little bit about that because, obviously, that’s a major focus of China’s development, but also compared to last year’s report you now have China at 600 nuclear warheads compared to 500 last year. And also, the report has some impressive displays of China’s silos and it showcased exactly how it’s – the laid out of that. I just wanted to ask you, how do you assess China’s nuclear development? And what does that mean in terms of how we can think about China’s capabilities moving forward?
Asst. Sec. Ratner: And I should say DASD Chase, prior even to this role, is one of the world’s leading experts on China’s nuclear program, so well-positioned to answer this question.
DASD Chase: That probably just made it a little harder to answer, right? (Laughs.)
But so I think we’ve noticed, actually, a lot of the media coverage on the report so far has focused on the nuclear expansion, so the increase in the assessed number of warheads in China’s inventory from 500 to 600 this year. And of course, we also talk about how we expect that to expand to more than a thousand by the end of this decade and to continue increasing afterwards. And that focus is certainly very understandable, but we also talk in the report about not just the expansion in numbers but also the increase in quality.
So we talk about the growing technological sophistication, the increasing diversity of China’s nuclear arsenal. So, again, if you go back to thinking about these reports as kind of a body of work that’s stretched across administrations now for more than two decades, if you go back to the earlier China Military Power Reports, what did they say about China’s nuclear capabilities? They said that China had a very, very small, relatively outdated nuclear arsenal that, when we first started publishing these reports – when DOD first started publishing these reports – basically consisted of, like, a few dozen outdated ICBMs and a pretty modest regional nuclear deterrent capability that was operated solely by the PLA Rocket Force. And what we’ve seen over time is that they have expanded to a nuclear triad with the PLA Navy having ballistic missile submarines conducting deterrence patrols, as we cover in the report, and that the PLA Air Force has also regained a nuclear deterrence and strike mission with the addition of nuclear-capable bombers.
And what we’re tracking in recent years here also is increasing diversity in capabilities like precision strike capable missiles with lower-yield nuclear warheads. In addition to the other services getting into the nuclear deterrence and strike mission area the PLA Rocket Force, of course, also is diversifying its capabilities with those more accurate regional missiles and lower-yield warheads. And so that gives the PRC a wider range of options in terms of the kind of nuclear deterrence operations they would conduct, as well as the kind of having more rungs on the escalation ladder in terms of how they could conduct nuclear operations. And when you put all of that together, I think it raises a lot of concerns about strategic stability, and particularly because we have urged them to be more transparent and more forthcoming and engage in more dialogue on these issues and they’ve been extremely reluctant to do that. So I think going forward for the PRC to be more transparent and to participate in some more discussions about strategic risk reduction could help address some of those challenges.
But just as Ely mentioned with respect to all of the conventional force modernization, the posture developments, and everything else that we’re doing focused on the pacing challenge here, there – of course it’s the case that the PRC’s nuclear expansion and modernization is also making them a bigger consideration in terms of what we’re doing in with our own investments in nuclear deterrence to make sure, as our Nuclear Posture Review commits us to do, that we’ll be able to do what we need to do there to ensure that neither the United States nor its allies and partners can be coerced.
Asst. Sec. Ratner: And just to maybe lift up a couple of those points, which is on the – one of the first points Mike was making, which was that, you know, already the reporting on this year’s report, there’s been a lot of focus as there is every year on the nuclear weapons issue. And there tends to be a what’s the new number, what’s the new number. That’s important. What I think the point that Mike is making here is the diversification of their delivery systems is also really important, and something that is underscored in this report and worthy of continued study and analysis. So that’s point number one.
And then point number two, exactly as Mike mentioned, I mean, this is an area – the expansion of China’s nuclear program raises the question of what are all these nuclear weapons for exactly, given that they have had this more limited sort of doctrine in the past. And they haven’t answered that question. And I think Mike and his team, in terms of leading the bilateral engagement with the PRC on – in terms of defense diplomacy, the State Department, others at the secretary’s level have been trying to better understand and engage in substantive discussions with the PRC and the PLA about their military modernization. And the answer so far has been, no, we are not going to talk about that. Explicit refusal to talk about that. And that’s a continued problem. That’s also true in some of the other emerging domains, space and cyber. We are not having the level of strategic conversations that we need to be having about risk reduction. And that is absolutely something, looking forward, that we’ll need to mature in the military-to-military relationship.
Dr. Lin: And I guess I would point out there’s a very carefully worded paragraph in terms, to your point, of the diversification, how that may change China’s nuclear policy strategy. I think, if – I don’t remember the exact wording, but I think is goes to your point. Like, it provides China with more options. And we need to – we need to really think through, is China really going to abide by its no first use? Or are there are more ways that nuclear weapons could be used?
But now I want to switch topics to some of the special topics covered. And you mentioned already the corruption in the PLA as a special topic. And I think that links to some of the recent media reporting on what’s happening within China now, including what’s happening to Admiral Miao Hua and others. How much is – from your assessment, how much does corruption in the PLA really impact China’s capabilities? And linked to what you were talking about, Ely, earlier, about the possibility for China to use large-scale force abroad, does that decrease the incentives for that, or decrease the ability for China to execute any of these large contingencies?
Asst. Sec. Ratner: Well, maybe I’ll take a first cut at that, and then Mike can dig a little deeper. I mean, I think the first answer to that question is the PRC leadership sure seems to think so, right? Or otherwise, maybe they wouldn’t be decapitating large elements of the PLA, which is incredibly disruptive from a bureaucratic standpoint. So I think the extremis of the anticorruption hunt is reflective of a serious concern that this is having serious problems. And I don’t think this is just, hey, some guys are taking some money and putting it in their pocket, or maybe at their banquets they’re buying too expensive whiskey, as was the problem in the past. And we’ve seen some reporting on particular modernization programs that have faced challenges.
But beyond that, beyond questions of, you know, are their missiles going to fly or whatnot, I think there are questions about the overall effect on the PLA and the whole – the way in which corruption reverberates through the entire system, and what that means. So obviously, defer to the PRC to answer questions about exactly how the modernization has affected their – what they’re seeing inside their own system. But I think the dramatic nature of the anticorruption hunt would only be the case if they thought it was really eroding their effect.
DASD Chase: Yeah, I agree with that completely. And I think if you just look at the language that China’s senior leaders use to describe the intensity of the anticorruption campaign and why it’s so vital, that gives you a good sense of how they see it. And as recently as, I think was about a week or two ago, Xi Jinping was giving a speech in which he addressed anticorruption. And he talked about turning the knife inward, I think was the quote. And so that, I think, says something about the threat that they perceive corruption presenting to the Chinese Communist Party, and to the PLA in particular.
And it’s – as Ely said, in the past a lot of times we were looking at buying and selling promotions or bribes that came in the form of banquets or expensive bottles of liquor, and the like. And while that may very well still be a problem, what we’re seeing that is really jumping out – and we cover in the China Military Power Report – is that it’s corruption that’s taking down the leaders of the PLA Rocket Force, which is – in a way, has always been looked at as the most trusted of the services, because of the sensitivity of the nuclear deterrence and strike mission for which it’s shouldered, really sole responsibility for a long time, and still shoulders a lot of the responsibility.
And you look at the removal of a former defense minister who was previously the head of the equipment development department. Well, in that role he presumably would have signed off on basically all major PRC acquisition programs during the period when he was the head of the equipment development department. And we also see senior executives from the defense industry being rolled up in some of the anticorruption campaigns. So that suggests that the corruption now can relate to major military construction projects, to research development and acquisition programs, and therefore has maybe a different kind of impact on the PLA’s ability to meet the capabilities development milestones that Xi Jinping has set out for them. It certainly has to shake the leadership’s confidence in the political reliability of the PLA and, again, its sort of overall ability to deliver what they’ve been tasked to deliver.
Asst. Sec. Ratner: Yeah, and I think two additional points here. One, we know, and we have seen in the past in previous anticorruption campaigns, that often these types of campaigns do cause paralysis institutionally at lower levels, as there is high level of risk aversion of engaging in activities that may lead to some of these investigations. So that has a bottom-up effect of more negativity in the institution.
I think the other thing to remind folks of is that these corruption campaigns are often some of the most closely held from an information perspective. We often don’t hear about them until they’re done and concluded. And what that should lead us to believe is that what we are seeing now – which already has been substantial, right, 15 senior PLA officials already rounded up – is just the tip of the iceberg. And one should expect that this is going to – something that’s going to continue and we’re going to see more and more of in the years ahead.
DASD Chase: Yeah, just the last thing I was add is, to Ely’s point, that they usually don’t say a lot, or sometimes really anything about these investigations until they’re concluded. When they are concluded, what we often see is that there’s kind of a spiraling effect where, when they identify corruption in one institution or in one program then that leads to – you know, essentially that generates leads that result in further investigation. So oftentimes it becomes a – you know, a process of going from one project to, well, who oversaw and improved that project and what other projects that they oversee and improve? And it becomes sort of something that ultimately entangles more people and more programs and more construction projects, and the like. And so if that’s going on here, we could have, I think, a prolonged period of time during which the anticorruption activities have that kind of effect.
Dr. Lin: And can I just follow up on this? So, given what you’ve seen so far in the most recent anticorruption efforts, has that impacted at all how the PLA engages with DOD, or what you’re seeing in terms of PLA operations?
Asst. Sec. Ratner: Well, it certainly has impacted the way the PLA is engaged with DOD, insofar as there was no defense minister for a long – no, I mean, kidding aside, right, there was – there was a gap because of a corruption investigation that led to a period of time where our secretary of defense did not have a counterpart at major international summits to meet with. I think that is a substantial effect. And Mike has had some experience of this among our pol-mil dialogs as well.
DASD Chase: Yeah, I think that’s right. I mean, it inevitably has an impact. And then, of course, you know, we had – that period of time was even more prolonged because the previous minister wasn’t willing to meet with the secretary due to the U.S. sanctions. So that did kind of prolong that period. And I wouldn’t say it’s necessarily had an impact on the operations, as I’m sure we’ll talk about later. The nature of the operations that we’ve seen around Taiwan and the South China Sea over the past year is – continues to – the pressure campaign on Taiwan has been, you know, quite notable over this whole period of time. But in terms of the external military relations, in terms of their internal confidence in the PLA, and certainly in terms of the construction projects, and the programs in the defense industry, and the ground-based nuclear and conventional missile force, right, where we’ve seen the removal of much of the leadership of the Rocket Force during the period of time we cover in the report, that’s undoubtedly a major impact.
Dr. Lin: I think, Mike, you’re reminding me to cover the portion of questions regarding Chinese behavior in the region. So you just referenced Chinese course of behavior against Taiwan, against our allies and partners in the South China Sea. As you look at what has happened in the year or so covered by the report but also if you want to reference any of the recent developments, which of course are not covered by the report, do you see any major changes or new tactics or new operations in terms of how China has been using more coercive military force either against Taiwan or against any of our allies in the South China Sea, or against Japan in the East China Sea?
DASD Chase: So we continue to see a lot of behavior that looks like it’s intended to be intimidating or coercive, and that certainly includes a lot of the operational activity around Taiwan. We had the Joint Sword exercise in response to President Lai’s inauguration speech. We’ve had a, you know, number of other PLA exercises carried out during the period of time covered in the report. And also, the erosion of longstanding norms around Taiwan – for example, the Taiwan Strait center line, where Taiwan Strait center line crossings used to be relatively rare and were reserved for political signaling purposes, as at least is our interpretation of why the PRC conducted them historically. Instead, they’ve become something that, if you just track the statistics that Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense releases, have now become routine where we – you know, we generally see hundreds of Strait center line crossings a year as opposed to just a very, you know, small number in response to a particular event. So I think that’s one way in which we’ve seen the erosion of some of those longstanding norms and behavior around Taiwan that we, of course, are concerned about and that we note in the report.
Asst. Sec. Ratner: And folks who have been following this story over the last few years have known that one of the things that we expressed a lot of concern about in the 2021 and 2022 period, including me from this stage, was a pattern or risky and coercive intercepts by the PLA. What we have seen in the more recent history has been a substantial decline in those against U.S. aircraft and that is really important.
I think that’s the result of the degree to which the department took extraordinary steps to expose that activity and that was combined with some very senior level diplomacy between the United States and the PRC to really communicate just how dangerous and unproductive that behavior was, and we have seen a substantial increase against U.S. aircraft.
Now, at the same time –
Dr. Lin: Decrease.
Asst. Sec. Ratner: Sorry, decrease. Decrease. Yes, thank you.
At the same time, we have continued to see really intensive coercion against U.S. allies and partners and that has spanned, really, the entirety of the East Asian littoral, certainly against the Philippines, new activities in the East China Sea. Mike mentioned some of those around Taiwan as well.
What I will say, connecting back to the earlier part of the conversation, is even as we have seen the PRC and the PLA engaging in more intensive, coercive operations and larger operations against U.S. allies and partners, those have also been learning experiences for the United States to really understand how does the PLA operate to really identify, again, getting back to the earlier part of the conversation, where are those ongoing, substantial vulnerabilities that the PLA faces. And so those are important events for us as well.
Dr. Lin: And what about Chinese PLA behavior beyond its immediate periphery?
I also noticed that in the section on overseas basing there were two additional locations added in terms of where there was Chinese interest compared to 2023 and it was Cuba and Gabon. So in terms of as you’re looking at Chinese operations beyond its immediate periphery what are you seeing in terms of broad trends and what are you most worried about?
DASD Chase: So as we note in the report and as you highlighted a couple of additional locations that we’ve added to the list, the PLA continues to pursue a project of expanding its overseas presence, looking at not only bases but other kinds of overseas military facilities whether for intelligence collections, space situational awareness, military training facilities that would allow them to also deepen their partnerships with the host countries, potentially also giving them a foothold for other types of facilities or more PLA presence in the future.
So they’re looking at a number of different types of facilities. Certainly, they faced, I think, some setbacks in their pursuit of those facilities and a number of the countries that are on the list. But they’ve also tended to then look to other countries that from their perspective, presumably, provide similar advantages or similar opportunities.
And so I think as long as the PRC judges that it has overseas economic and security interests that are vulnerable or opportunities to expand their interests in pursuit of their goals they’ll continue to try to pursue those types of agreements with potential host countries for different types of overseas military facilities. I would also expect that they’ll continue to face some challenges in doing that.
Asst. Sec. Ratner: Yeah. I mean, I think this is one of the really interesting stories of the last few years which is this discussion of PLA overseas basing has been one that has been actually quite prominent for PLA experts for many, many years.
The demand from the PRC for these things is vast. They will take almost anything they can get globally. Their list of targets is very, very long. Those are listed in these reports, and it’s really just a supply question as to whether or not they’re going to be able to achieve their goals, and the fact that they haven’t this many years later is a really important story and there is a number of reasons why that’s the case.
But the ambition for the PLA to establish overseas facilities has been quite strong and, as Mike mentioned, they’ve, largely, failed in those endeavors.
Now, they have turned, as we have seen, tore away from often pursuing major operating bases toward policing arrangements and other ways in which they can insert themselves into security sectors and countries and in some ways embed themselves even more deeply with the ruling, often nondemocratic regimes that they’re trying to curry influence with.
So I think that is a trend absolutely to watch. But from a PLA basing perspective – I wonder if you were here eight years ago at a PLA conference and you asked folks, hey, in 2024 how many overseas facilities do you think the PLA is going to be operating. I think it would be a heck of a lot more than what we’re seeing today.
Dr. Lin: Thank you. I want to shift to another aspect of your report which I thought was very excellent and really recommend folks to read, which is the portion talking about the China-Russia relationship but also talking about China’s views of the Russia-North Korea relationship, and I think that’s very important to highlight because I think there’s sometimes a view in D.C. that the axis of upheaval there’s equal relationship between all four sides and I think this report makes it very clear that’s a difference in PRC perception and, perhaps, concern with the Russia-North Korea relationship.
But I do want to follow on the China-Russia side. Obviously, there’s been a lot of activity in terms of China-Russia military exercises, and your report also documents some of that. What are you – what’s your view of the deepening defense relationship between the two? And where do you see that headed?
DASD Chase: Yeah. I’ll start out and then turn over to Ely.
So I think we continue to see them conduct the maritime exercises, to participate in other – the PRC to participate in other Russian exercises, and the joint bomber patrols to take place with some regularity. And they will add some new elements to these over time, and – but a lot of the time I think they are also trying to kind of maximize the political signaling value to showcase more and deeper military cooperation.
I think where I would expect it to go over time is, I think, to the extent that Russia has probably become more dependent on the PRC in recent years, the PRC, I think, is probably going to want to exert more leverage to kind of extract greater cooperation from Russia in areas where Russia historically has been more reluctant. In the Arctic, for example, would be one example where that might take place.
But I think it’s also in certain respects kind of suggestive of a broader pattern of behavior that has applied in other parts of the world as well, where we see for instance the PRC not only kind of amplifying some of the Russian propaganda and disinformation about their war in Ukraine but also continuing to provide dual-use capabilities that support the Russian defense industry and the war effort. But of course, that’s not the only example that we have.
Asst. Sec. Ratner: To the question of the PRC perspective of the Russia-DPRK relationship, it’s a really interesting question. And, Bonny, I think your prompt is the right one, which is there is an assumption sometimes that all these folks are paddling in the same direction. In this case, I just don’t think that’s the case because the fact is that the Russia-DPRK relationship has come at the expense of the PRC-DPRK relationship, which has substantially eroded economically, politically, diplomatically. Whether that sustains is an open question, but there is no question that the relative – (laughs) – decline in the DPRK-PRC relationship has been exactly proportional to the increase in the DPRK-Russia relationship as the DPRK has realized it is much less reliant on the PRC for the kinds of things it can – it can get from Russia now. And how that develops in the future is absolutely something to watch.
I just think the other point I would make on this question of the China-Russia relationship and the degree to which the PRC has really been the lifeline for Russia for its war in Ukraine in terms of its defense industrial base, private companies providing capabilities that have been important into that conflict, this is just one of the ways in which the PRC’s anti-Western, anti-American orientation has been destabilizing not only in Europe, but in other theaters throughout the world. We’ve seen it very prominently in the Russia case, where the sort of presentation of neutrality in the Ukraine war is just not aligned with the facts.
But we’re also seeing in the Middle East where continued PRC support for Iran, for Hamas, for Hezbollah has continued, and very interestingly for the Houthis as well where we know that the Houthis have built a supply chain into the PRC for drones and missiles that they are using to attack international shipping. These are not just one-off transactions; this is really systemic in terms of how the Houthis are acquiring the capabilities they need. Beijing knows this is happening, and as far as we can tell they have not taken steps to stop it. And beyond that, there are also – reportedly, there are – a bargain that has been struck between the Houthis and Beijing that as long as the Houthis don’t attack PRC shipping, then Beijing is going to provide diplomatic and political support to the Houthis. And that is just an extraordinarily destabilizing set of activities.
So I think the Russia piece is important, but we ought to not leave out the Middle East piece as well.
Dr. Lin: Right. And then I can point out there is also a(n) excellent portion on China’s relations with Iranian proxies which talk about – which document, written, so that folks can reference many of what you talked about, Ely.
Asst. Sec. Ratner: And it makes you wonder, Bonny, I mean, just thinking about the arc of the China debate and those who have been working on this issue for decades now, if you rewound back to when people were – when it was fashionable to be talking about the rise of China, you know, when we were thinking about a decade ago when Xi Jinping was taking lead of the country. Again, if you had kind of asked at that time what kind of world – what kind of role does China see for itself in the world, I don’t think our answer would have been, you know, providing Russia with the capability to continue a war in Europe and working with Iranian proxies and the Middle East to destabilize the region. So it’s a little bit – it’s interesting to see where they have found themselves, which I would imagine is different from where their aspirations were geopolitically.
Dr. Lin: And if I could follow up a little bit more on the China-Russia relationship. It sounds like, from what the two of you are saying, is the military exercise are, at most, coordinated exercises. We’re not truly seeing any demonstration of ability to operate together in terms of how we operate with our allies and partners.
Asst. Sec. Ratner: Yeah. And that’s in part because of the Russian limited operations throughout the Indo-Pacific, which largely have been about defense, diplomacy, and signaling and messaging, and not advanced operational activity. So, at least my perspective would be, I don’t think that’s a reason to dismiss the military relationship. Some of the technology and capabilities that are going back and forth and some of the potential integration of the defense industrial base is significant and important and accelerating. And that may be the place to watch. And operationally, certainly, they have rattled the cages of Indo-Pacific countries – conducting missions around Japan, taking actions that threaten South Korea. So not to dismiss them, but we are not seeing the kind of advanced operations that that maybe some folks are imagining.
Dr. Lin: OK. I’m cognizant I need to wrap this up in five minutes to leave enough time for Q&A. So the last question I have for the two of you are on the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship, the nature of the contacts that we still have with the PLA. And I raise this noting that I think the likely incoming Trump team is probably more wary of the value of mil-mil contacts, and what we’re actually getting from the PLA side. So I wanted to get your sense on how do you assess the military-to-military relationship and what do you think we could get from the PLA, whether that’s in terms of coronation or cooperation. What value do we get from the mil-mil relationship?
DASD Chase: Sure, I’ll say, realistically, there are going to be very few areas of genuine cooperation. The one that comes to mind is the remains recovery work that our DPAA, our prisoner of war and missing in action accounting agency, does in the PRC, which does receive cooperation from the PLA Archives Bureau. But when you get beyond that, I think we really look at a relationship that is largely about reducing the risk that competition veers into conflict, that’s about trying to reduce the risk of misperception or clarify misperceptions about trying to make sure that we’ve got channels of communication that are open so we can – so we can do that.
And since President Biden’s meeting with Xi Jinping in late November of 2023, we have reopened a lot of those lines of communication. I would say, generally speaking, the ones that take place at kind of the working level to midlevel, we’ve been able to successfully execute those engagements. So things like the MMCA, those are our operational safety talks that happen between INDOPACOM and the PLA. And that’s a venue for us to highlight for them instances in which their operational behavior has been unsafe, you know, has posed a risk to U.S. forces. The PRC, I don’t think is going to find analogous cases, but it’s their opportunity also to highlight cases where they have a problem that they want to express with U.S. operations in the region. And that is an important way of making sure that our forces can operate safely and professionally, and that we avoid incidents that can be avoided with the PLA.
We’ve also had some working-level discussions, actually building on one that took place for the first time toward the end of the first Trump administration, which was called the Crisis Communication and Prevention Working Group. We held a second round of that with the – with the PLA this year. And I think those are – those working-level exchanges, they tended to be less subject to the PRC canceling them because they – or refusing to schedule them for one reason or another. And I think those are an important way for us to make sure that we can send a clear message to them about our priorities, about areas where we have concerns about their behavior, what they’re doing, whether it’s operationally or otherwise.
We’ve also had some working-level discussions with them about translation and terminology to make sure that we understand what they’re trying to convey, and, importantly, to make sure that when we have policy and strategy documents that reference the PRC, that they understand clearly the message that we’re trying to send to them, that they don’t misunderstand it. Where we’ve had a harder time getting things on the calendar and keeping them there, of course, is with the senior leader exchanges, where the PRC continues to decline those from – they have – we have had, certainly, some of them since last November.
Of course, the chairman had a call with his PLA counterpart. The secretary met with PRC minister of national defense at the Shangri-La Dialog, for instance. We’ve had a couple of exchanges between the INDOPACOM commander and the PLA southern theater commander. But we continue to be challenged in that the PRC perhaps doesn’t see the value of having those engagements sometimes, or at least weighs it as less valuable than the political message that they want to send by canceling or refusing to schedule them.
And so an example of that would be that we did not have a meeting between the secretary and PRC minister of national defense at the most recent ADMM-Plus meeting. We extended that invitation. The PRC declined it. And they continue to tell us that they – they’ll say the atmosphere needs to be conducive to those exchanges. And when they judge it to be less than conducive, then they won’t schedule, or potentially will cancel some of the senior leader exchanges.
Asst. Sec. Ratner: Yeah. So you obviously have to have a willing partner who’s willing to engage in substantive conversations. And look, Bonny, I think there’s good reason to be skeptical that military-to-military contacts are somehow going to lead to a fundamental change in PRC perceptions or PRC strategy or PRC behavior. That being said, I would say that even for the most skeptical there is real evidence that, in instances where the United States needs to communicate something one way, right?
We need to directly communicate something, that either something we are going to do, this is the reason why we’re doing it, and this is what we are expecting out of the PLA as a response, is really important to do; and, similarly, to be able to say very clearly, you really should not do action X because it will have particular implications, you want to have those channels, and you want to be able to communicate that. And in a total breakdown or an unwillingness to talk, it’s not going to happen.
So the reason why Secretary Austin has been saying now for four years that we want to pursue open lines of communication with the PRC, and why he thinks that’s important for senior defense leaders especially in times of tension, maybe especially when the atmosphere isn’t right, is not because he thinks there is going to be a convincing or a change fundamentally in the character and nature of the PRC, or PRC behavior. But rather, there are times when it is fundamentally in the U.S. national interest to be able to communicate things to the PRC and the PLA. And we want to have a channel to do that.
DASD Chase: Yeah, I’ll give, I mean, just a couple of examples. I mean, one, to be able to talk about the unsafe operational behavior very directly. We did also, of course, release a lot of information about that publicly. But being able to have a direct channel of communication to address specific incidents or a pattern of behavior. And then also things like, for example, cyberactivity. If you think that perhaps it’s not being well understood on the other side, or being totally misunderstood how we might respond to a particular activity, to be able to communicate clearly that the response is not going to be what the PRC appears to expect it to be ahead of time obviously can have an effect in terms of deterring that kind of activity. But at the very least, make sure that they have a clear understanding of what we’re seeing and how we’re going to respond to it.
Asst. Sec. Ratner: So maybe just the simplest way to say that is that you can be very skeptical, you can be very clear-eyed, and you can also think this is a good idea.
Dr. Lin: Great. Thank you. With that, let me open the – open it to questions from the audience. Let’s take – I’m seeing four. Let’s just take these four from the audience first.
Q: Thanks so much for taking my question. This is Ryo Kiyomiya for the Asahi Shimbun Japanese newspaper.
My question is about China’s goal in expanding nuclear capabilities. The report mentioned that China’s force modernization suggests that it seeks the ability to inflict overwhelming damage to an adversary in a nuclear exchange. Do you estimate that China could achieve its goal by 2035? And what factors could impact their trajectory of nuclear expansion? Thank you.
Q: Do I go on? OK. OK, hi. This is Mark (sp.) from United Daily – from United Daily News based in Taiwan.
So combined with the conventional military exercise we have seen this year several cases of gray zone operation at the cross strait. So I think – which many believe are breaking the existing norm. So I think – do you think this is the approach – the Chinese new strategy? And how would you advise Taiwan or Philippines when facing such challenges? Thank you.
Q: OK. This is Sangmin, a reporter from Radio Free Asia.
I have a question about relationship between DPRK, PRC, and then Russia. You mentioned about China’s concern that deepening relationship between North Korea and Russia. So do you have any indication that China try to involved in stopping such military cooperation between Russia and China, such as pressuring the North Koreans, something like that?
Dr. Lin: One last one.
Q: Yes. Hi. This is Tina Chung with Voice of America’s Chinese division.
I’d like to follow up with Mark’s (sp.) question about Taiwan. China’s maritime operation last week, you know, very expansive and involved three theater commands: north, east, and south. Because China is keeping quiet on this operation, I just wonder how does DOD assess the nature, intention, and signaling of this operation? Thank you.
Asst. Sec. Ratner: Maybe I’ll go first, take a couple of those. Those are all really excellent questions.
On the gray zone question, you know, maybe I’ll take the question of what do we do about it, because we do see intensifying PLA/PRC gray zone activity toward Taiwan, toward the Philippines as you mentioned, toward other partners. I think the way that I would respond to that is the most important thing is not necessarily stopping the gray zone activity; it is ensuring that the strategic goal of that gray zone activity, to the extent that it is running counter to our shared ambition with the region for a free and open Indo-Pacific, does not succeed.
And so if you – if you take the case of the Philippines, right, there have been skirmishes around Second Thomas Shoal, skirmishes out at Scarborough Reef, and sometimes there is a – there is sort of a laser focus on those events saying look at what the PRC is doing; they’re gaining advantage. And if you zoom back and look at the broader picture with the Philippines, what have we seen over the last few years? We have seen a historically strengthening and deepening U.S.-Philippines alliance. We have seen the United States adding new posture sites at strategic locations at the Philippines. We have seen the administration working with Congress to make a historic, unprecedented investment of $500 million in foreign military financing for the Philippines. We have seen the Philippines and the United States coming together as never before with allies and partners in the region to be operating – U.S., Philippines, Japan, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, others in the region – to express a shared commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific.
So the broader strategic picture, to me, is not that China is gaining strategic advantage from its gray zone activities. So there is the tactical question, and then there’s the broader strategic question. And we ought to be focused on the tactical question because it’s important, but we ought not lose sight of the strategic question, where I don’t think China’s achieving its strategic aims through this behavior.
On the PRC-Russia-DPRK question, have we seen the PRC trying to stop the Russia-DPRK relationship? I think my answer to that would be, look, number one, they have limited influence to do so. And number two, while they may not like it because it is undermining their own influence with the DPRK, it is also the case that the DPRK-Russia relationship is advancing China’s strategic aims of strengthening Russia and undermining NATO and dividing Europe. So I think there is a degree to which they are unable to change that behavior and a degree to which that behavior is actually in support of their aims. So we have not seen an extraordinary effort by the PRC to try to stop that behavior.
DASD Chase: And I’ll try to address the other two questions.
On the goals of Chinese nuclear expansion and modernization out to 2035, I think they would have to tell us more about what they have in mind. What we have heard from them in our discussions is largely consistent with what they’ve said over the course of many years, that their policy and their strategy haven’t changed and they’ll tell us that they continue to maintain their nuclear force at a level that they see as what’s necessary to meet their national security needs. I think our response to that, basically, is, well, if – let’s say – let’s take it at face value that they maintain their force at the level that’s required for their national security needs. Clearly, they’re thinking about what that is has changed a lot over the years because we see this expansion and diversification and increase in the sophistication of their capabilities. So they either think their national security needs have changed or they think what’s required to meet them is a lot more than it used to be, and it would be essentially on the PRC to try to explain to us, I think, which one in what way and how and where that leads them for 2035, and they haven’t been willing to do that. We’ve tried to engage them in that discussion and we’ve been more often than not basically met with – met with silence.
As for the PLA operations, when they have a certain level of activity that becomes sort of routine and routinely includes things that are eroding norms that have lasted for many years as around Taiwan it’s – that’s kind of one category of challenges.
And then we’ve also got just more exercises that take place involving larger numbers and different types of units at greater distances from China than was historically the case. And if they want people, whether it’s us or you all, to have a clear understanding of the message and the intent underlying that activity they’re going to have to describe that, whether publicly or in communications with us in DOD or otherwise.
We will be left to develop our own conclusions about that and all of you, whether you’re in the academic or think tank world or in the media, will be left to draw your own conclusions as well.
So I would, certainly, argue it’s in their interest to be more forthcoming and more open to engagement on those topics but that’s up to them to decide if they want to do that.
Dr. Lin: Great. I think we have time for, like, another round of questions online, and this one’s from Bloomberg News. The report for the second year in a row says China’s six Jin-class ICBM subs are conducting deterrence patrols. Have these patrols sailed closer to Hawaii or U.S. West Coast for strategic messaging?
And then – give me one second – two other questions. One is about how can U.S. allies and partners respond to swarming and blockade tactics by the PRC, and there’s, obviously, a lot of questions so we can’t go through them.
I’m just picking out the questions that deviate the most from what’s already been asked. This question is about how do you view China’s ongoing – how does the U.S. view China’s ongoing improved relations with India and what does that mean for China’s military strategy or military capabilities.
Asst. Sec. Ratner: OK. Maybe I’ll take a swing at a couple of those.
On the first one, look, it gets back to the gray zone question a little bit. But this question of swarming or blockade we have been working very closely with our allies and partners throughout the region to try to enable them to work in concert with us but also on their own to respond to this behavior and that has come in a lot of different flavors that we’ve seen.
One is focusing, working with them on acquiring the capabilities that are most pertinent to being able to manage that, whether that’s for maritime domain awareness or other types of unmanned or asymmetric capabilities.
That’s been a real focus for this administration, and we’ve made a lot of progress in terms of some of those low-cost asymmetric solutions that are off the shelf that are commercial that can be applied quite quickly have been successful. I think that we’ll see more of that in the years ahead.
Allies and partners, I think, have also been successful in the ways in which they are bringing this behavior to light insofar as it allows for rallying more international concern and support for allies and partners and when appropriate portraying the PRC as the aggressor, and that is an important thing to do in terms of shaping and curbing this behavior.
And then, finally, just another example – there are other areas as well – working with allies and partners on questions of resilience as well so that they’re able to sustain, whether it’s economic coercion or other types of pressure, that they are resilient and can last through forms of PLA and PRC coercion.
So I think there’s been a lot of learning in that regard over the last couple years and that’s good because it’s stabilizing and that kind of malign behavior, I think, is less effective than maybe it was in the past.
Mike, maybe I’ll go over to you and then come back on another one.
DASD Chase: Sure. Yeah. I guess I would just say on the question about the ballistic missile submarine patrol areas we don’t have anything to share on that beyond what’s covered in the report about the Jin-class submarines.
On the blockade question I would just add that it’s the kind of thing that certainly we’ve seen the PLA practice some of the operations that would be part of a blockade in doing that. As Ely said earlier, it also allows us to learn about how they would conduct those operations about some of the shortcomings that could be exposed and about some of the vulnerabilities that could be exploited and also potentially would open them up to some of the other vulnerabilities and pressure points that we note in the report such as of their energy supplies.
Dr. Lin: Mike, could you talk a little bit more broadly about deterrence patrols? I know you can’t answer the specific question about Hawaii or West Coast, but my understanding the report says that the distance of these deterrence patrols have been increasing over time.
DASD Chase: Yeah, and I think they don’t really need to necessarily – just like anyone else conducting a ballistic missile submarine deterrence patrol, conducting the patrol in and of itself is sort of the deterrence message. Although, they certainly do write in some of their literature about how they could amplify that message if so desired. For example, including reporters and having it covered on official television, or something along those lines. But apart from that, I don’t really have much to add, I’m afraid, beyond what’s in the report.
Asst. Sec. Ratner: And I would just say very quickly, on the India question, the U.S.-India defense relationship stands on its own. It is accelerating and advancing in terrific and exciting ways, both as it relates to defense industrial base cooperation as well as operational cooperation across the services, all domains, and I think is a – is a continue – is a continuing growth area, even as the India-China relationship waxes and wanes.
Dr. Lin: Great, I think we are perfectly at time.
Asst. Sec. Ratner: Could I have just one more word before we wrap up?
Dr. Lin: Yes, of course.
Asst. Sec. Ratner: Which is, I think just – did want to take this moment to just say – acknowledge the just incredible contribution from DASD Chase. I think he was one of the very first senior officials to come into the building, I think, in early February. And has lasted to this point where talking about the military power report today he has now personally, with his leadership in office, honchoed this. He has taken on some additional responsibilities throughout his tenure, taking on the Taiwan account – coming in as the China for – the DASD for China, leaving as the DASD for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia. And I don’t think we’re going to get the chance to be on the stage again together, and maybe our – Mike’s last public event. But would just hope folks could join me in acknowledging and saying congratulations and thank you to Mike for just a really terrific run. (Applause.)
Dr. Lin: I think we should also thank Ely for being one of the longest-serving officials in Department of Defense, as well as across the Biden administration too. So let’s give also Ely a round of applause. (Applause.)
So with that, both Ely and Mike have to go back to the to the Pentagon relatively quickly. So if folks can stay in their seat and we let them exit. Thank you, again, both for joining me and, again, the report is already online, and we also have some hard copies if you want them. So thank you both again.
