The journey of reprogrammable semiconductors through their supply chain

Field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) are a critical but often overlooked component of the semiconductor industry. This interactive graphic and the full report examine the highly concentrated and globalized FPGA supply chain, highlighting key vulnerabilities and strategic chokepoints.

As FPGAs are increasingly vital for AI infrastructure, telecommunications, military applications, and automotive systems, understanding this complex ecosystem is essential for economic resilience and national security. Despite US leadership in design and electronic design automation (EDA) software, FPGA manufacturing and other types of semiconductor production remain heavily dependent on East Asian foundries, particularly Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC). China’s control over essential raw materials and significant presence in assembly, testing, and packaging operations creates heightened supply chain risks for the United States.

The following interactive graphic offers a concise overview of the nuances that make the FPGA supply chain uniquely challenging. These differentiated characteristics show that the FPGA ecosystem requires in-depth analysis and unique policy instruments as part of a broader effort to sustain American supply chain security and technological leadership.

To learn more, read the full report here:

Hover over elements in the graphic to view which part of the supply chain they belong to. Click to learn more about each stage in the supply chain.

As shown above, the FPGA supply chain differs from the overall semiconductor supply chain in important ways—particularly in the importance of production at lagging-edge process nodes, the substantial concentration of design firms, and the inherent flexibility of FPGA chips. The United States maintains key strengths in FPGA design, including EDA software and the software used to reprogram these chips. However, its leadership in this segment may be threatened as the United States continues to heavily rely on East Asian manufacturers and Chinese assembly, testing, and packaging and raw materials, all while Chinese FPGA firms continue to expand their product capabilities. 

Andrew Kidd holds a master of public policy from the Harvard Kennedy School and was previously an engagement manager in the high-tech and public sector practices at McKinsey & Company.

Celine Lee holds a master of public policy from the Harvard Kennedy School and previously held fellowships at the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT).

Bruce Schneier is a security technologist and a fellow and lecturer at the Harvard Kennedy School.

The ’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative, part of the Technology Programs, works at the nexus of geopolitics and cybersecurity to craft strategies to help shape the conduct of statecraft and to better inform and secure users of technology.