Cyber attacks are no longer confined to the realm of IT – they are a systemic risk to economies, governments, and public trust. Nowhere is this more evident than in the UK’s newly formalised approach to cyber security. With the government now advancing a ban on ransom payments by public sector entities and introducing mandatory incident reporting, the country is drawing a firmer line in the sand. These moves signal a decisive shift in the nation’s cyber security posture: one aimed at undermining the profitability of ransomware and driving greater transparency in its aftermath.
But bold action brings consequences. Will banning ransom payments truly deter attackers or merely change their tactics? And how will this policy resonate across Europe’s increasingly fragmented regulatory landscape?
What’s unfolding in the UK could well be a defining inflexion point in Europe’s broader response to ransomware.
A shifting threat with rising stakes
Ransomware has evolved into a highly professionalised criminal enterprise. Threat actors now are better funded, more patient, and extremely strategic. In the past, many organisations opted to pay ransoms quietly, weighing the ethical discomfort against operational paralysis or reputational fallout. But this calculus is shifting. Governments and regulators are growing wary of a cycle that appears to reward criminal behaviour.
The UK’s public sector ransom ban aims to change that. The intent is clear. By removing the financial incentive, public organisations become less attractive targets, and the volume of attacks will fall. But there’s a catch: ransomware groups are adaptable. If encryption doesn’t work, they’ll pivot. In fact, they already have towards data exfiltration, double extortion, and the threat of public leaks, often targeting the very data that underpins citizen trust and institutional credibility.
Walking the ethical tightrope
The ethical argument for banning ransom payments is strong – starve the attackers of funding, and you weaken the ecosystem. But translating principles into policy is rarely straightforward. Public sector organisations like hospitals, local councils, and transportation networks manage critical services where downtime has life-and-death implications.
These entities are often underfunded and overexposed. If hit with a ransomware attack and legally barred from paying, their recovery relies entirely on the strength of their backups, the clarity of their incident response plans, and the resilience of their operations. Balancing a principled cybersecurity stance with the pragmatic need to ensure operational continuity is a complex challenge that demands careful consideration.
Hospitals, councils, and other essential services can’t afford prolonged downtime. For the policy to work, public sector organisations will have to prioritise recovery above all else as part of a complete cyber-resilient strategy
Success hinges on their ability to shift from reactive defence to proactive resilience. That means stronger backups, clearer governance, and well-rehearsed response plans. The policy’s success depends on how well these organisations can maintain service continuity during disruption.
The knock-on effect for the private sector
The UK’s approach raises another pressing question: if public entities are off-limits, will ransomware groups simply shift focus to the private sector? The ransomware ban doesn’t apply to private businesses – yet. But the writing is on the wall. With public entities shielded, attackers are likely to pivot toward private organisations, especially in sectors like finance, logistics, and manufacturing. They should also be watching closely as new norms emerge. Even if ransom bans are not imposed on them directly, they could face greater regulatory scrutiny, especially around reporting obligations, breach disclosure, and customer communication.
There’s also the challenge of divergence. As different European nations explore their own approaches, the regulatory landscape is set to fragment. Multinational organisations will face a complex web of obligations, with varying timelines for breach reporting and different liabilities depending on jurisdiction. Amid this complexity, paying a ransom may seem like a quick fix, but it is never the answer. Such actions not only embolden attackers but can also expose businesses to further regulatory and reputational risks. Instead, the ability to coordinate a consistent and compliant response across borders will soon become the true marker of operational maturity.
Rethinking resilience: From technical to strategic
Regardless of whether a ransom ban directly affects them, organisations – public and private – should see the UK’s move as a moment to revisit their approach. The environment is shifting, and resilience is no longer optional. Here’s what should be top of mind:
- Resilience must go beyond IT: Cyber resilience is not just a technical problem; it’s a business survival issue. Organisations need clear governance structures that define how ransom decisions are made, who is informed, and how stakeholders are engaged. This includes executives, compliance teams, crisis communicators, and even insurers. Preparing for cyber threats starts in the boardroom, not the datacentre.
- Recovery readiness is key: Immutable backups, isolated environments, and rapid failover systems are critical, but often neglected until it’s too late. These systems need to be regularly tested – not just in theory, but in full simulations that involve leadership and frontline teams.
- Threat actors will pivot: Expect increased focus on data theft and reputational sabotage. This means that organisations must improve their ability to detect early-stage intrusions, lateral movement, and anomalous data flows. Proactive threat hunting and internal monitoring should become routine.
- Regulatory fragmentation is coming: Anticipate more granular and disjointed rules on breach reporting, ransom policy, and supply chain risk. Coordinated governance, policy flexibility, and jurisdictional awareness will separate the reactive from the resilient.
The opportunity: A more secure and transparent ecosystem
While the short-term outlook may feel turbulent, there is a long-term opportunity to create a stronger, more transparent cyber security ecosystem. The UK’s stance will serve as a case study – both in how governments can attempt to reset the economics of ransomware, and in how public institutions can (or can’t) absorb the operational shock.
Transparency breeds learning. With mandatory incident reporting now in place, we’ll begin to better understand the true volume, cost, and impact of attacks. That data can drive smarter regulation, targeted investment, and more informed risk assessment across sectors.
Organisations don’t need to wait for policy to catch up. Forward-thinking leaders will seize this moment to engage closely with CISOs, clarify decision-making authority, and rigorously test incident response plans. By fostering collaboration between CISOs, CTOs, and CIOs, they can drive shared responsibility across the organisation, shaping the future of cyber resilience in Europe.
Gartner analysts will present the current and future state of cyber security at the Gartner Security & Risk Management Summit 2025 in London, from 22-24 September.
Fintan Quinn is senior director analyst at Gartner, specialising in backup, disaster recovery, and storage architecture and solutions.
