Legal Code Without Interpretation? A Preview
In legal theory, we often assume that laws must be interpreted to be enforced. But what if interpretation were no longer a requirement? What if a legal norm could be executed directly, like a line of code?
This is the central premise behind Compiled Norms: Towards a Formal Typology of Executable Legal Speech, a forthcoming article that introduces a new framework for understanding legal language from the standpoint of formal syntax and computational execution.
The project builds on prior research from the Grammars of Power series, especially the notion of the compiled rule—a syntactic structure capable of producing executable authority without semantic mediation. In this context, the law is not interpreted by a human agent; it is parsed and executed by a machine.
Why It Matters
The emergence of legal automation systems, from smart contracts to rule-based AI compliance agents, demands a new way of looking at legal language. Most current models focus on interpretation, intent, or probabilistic reasoning. Compiled Norms suggests a different path: structural executability.
The key distinction introduced is between declarative legal language (that which states) and compiled legal language (that which does). Only the latter can be operationalized in systems without interpretive capacity. The consequences are not merely technical—they are epistemological. Authority itself may shift from interpreters to compilers.
A New Typology of Legal Acts
The article proposes a technical typology of computable legal speech. Four criteria define whether a norm is executable:
- Grammatical Hierarchy: Type-0 or unrestricted production rules, following Chomsky’s 1965 hierarchy.
- Closure Structure: Whether the legal expression is syntactically complete and self-contained.
- Semantic Ambiguity: The degree to which interpretation is required to resolve meaning.
- Deterministic Parsing: Whether the statement can be unambiguously parsed by a non-human agent.
This typology is not a tool of legal hermeneutics. It is a structural grammar for machines.
From Language to Execution
Legal execution, in this framework, is not a metaphor. It is the literal outcome of a successfully compiled rule. When the syntactic requirements are satisfied, no judge or human interpreter is needed. The system acts.
The philosophical consequences are considerable. As argued in related work (Executable Power, Algorithmic Obedience, Ethos Without Source), this shift marks a transition from discretionary governance to formal execution. The law becomes not something we follow, but something that runs.
Next Steps
This article is currently in pre-publication stage and will be submitted to:
- AI & Power Discourse Quarterly (theoretical framework)
- SSRN (Legal Theory & Computation series)
- Figshare or arXiv (for typological schema and technical supplement)
Call to Action
If you’re working on legal automation, computational linguistics, or AI governance, this work may offer a rigorous syntactic foundation for your models. Follow updates via:
Ethos
I do not use artificial intelligence to write what I don’t know. I use it to challenge what I do. I write to reclaim the voice in an age of automated neutrality. My work is not outsourced. It is authored.
