In the previous articles in this series, we looked at digital trust as a progression: we examined trust as a social mechanism, analysed governance as its point of failure, and walked through legitimacy as the condition that determines whether systems endure. This fourth piece extends that shared logic outward, beyond platforms themselves, into geopolitics.
A Regulatory Fight That Isn’t Really About Regulation
What looks like a trade dispute over digital platforms is, at a deeper level, a clash between two different ideas of trust.
Over the past few years, tensions between the United States and Europe around Big Tech have intensified: fines, threats of retaliation, accusations of protectionism, and talk of a looming transatlantic tech war. The EU frames its actions as necessary governance. The US increasingly frames them as discrimination.
But beneath the surface sits a quieter disagreement: what trust is, who is responsible for creating it, and whether it emerges from markets or must be engineered by institutions.
In this article we use US-European tensions around digital platforms as a lens to explore two fundamentally different cultural, philosophical, and legal understandings of trust – and why those differences make digital regulation so hard to align.
Why Digital Platforms Became a Transatlantic Fault Line
European-American tensions over digital platforms are often explained in narrow terms: competition law, content moderation, or data protection. Yet the pattern is striking. Almost all platforms targeted by the EU’s most ambitious digital laws – the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and the Digital Services Act (DSA) – are American.
From a European perspective, this is not a geopolitical choice but a structural one. Large platforms act as gatekeepers of markets, speech, and infrastructure. Left unchecked, they accumulate private power without corresponding public accountability. Regulation, in this view, is a way of restoring symmetry between power and responsibility.
From the US perspective, the same rules appear as ex ante constraints imposed on successful firms – rules that intervene before harm is proven and that disproportionately affect American companies. This fuels the accusation that Europe is exporting its regulatory preferences under the banner of fairness.
The disagreement is not merely legal. It reflects different assumptions about how trust in markets and platforms should be created.
Two Cultures of Trust: Individual Calculation vs. Institutional Assurance
In the United States, trust has historically been framed through a liberal-individualist lens. Trust is conditional, often transactional, and closely tied to performance and reputation. You trust because incentives align, contracts are enforceable, and exit is possible.
This intellectual orientation is not accidental. Much of Anglo‑American philosophy has treated interpersonal trust as the model case, debating whether trust rests primarily on goodwill and moral commitment, or on rational expectations and self‑interest. Thinkers such as Annette Baier and Karen Jones emphasised trust as a will‑based attitude grounded in care and recognition, while others, most notably Russell Hardin, framed trust as reasoned reliance where another’s interests are encapsulated in one’s own. Despite their differences, both traditions place agency, choice, and risk at the centre of trust.
This perspective is visible in American approaches to digital platforms. Users are expected to make informed choices, firms are trusted to innovate, and regulation tends to intervene after harm occurs rather than shaping systems in advance. Trust emerges from competition, disclosure, and accountability through courts.
European traditions approach trust differently. Trust is often seen as relational and socially embedded – something that allows complex societies to function by reducing uncertainty. It is not only interpersonal but institutional. Citizens trust systems because those systems are governed, predictable, and constrained by shared norms.
This helps explain why Europe places greater emphasis on collective safeguards, harmonised standards, and regulatory oversight. Trust is not assumed to arise naturally from markets; it must be stabilised by rules.
Trust in Institutions: Federal Skepticism vs. Cross-national Confidence
Differences in institutional trust further widen the transatlantic gap. In the US, trust in federal institutions is volatile and highly politicised. While Americans may trust local institutions or private actors, national regulatory authority often triggers suspicion. This creates a strong preference for sector-specific laws and minimal central coordination.
Europe presents a more complex picture. While trust in national governments varies widely, EU institutions are often trusted precisely because they are perceived as technocratic, rule-bound, and insulated from domestic political swings. In digital governance, this translates into confidence in cross-national frameworks to set baseline rules.
As a result, EU digital regulation is not merely about controlling firms; it is about sustaining trust in the integrity of the single market itself.
Trust as Infrastructure: When Law Replaces Assumptions
One illustrative example of this difference can be seen in how digital trust is formalised in law. In Europe, trust is increasingly treated as infrastructure: stabilised through shared standards, defined roles, and supervisory oversight. Frameworks like eIDAS reflect a broader belief that trust should not rely solely on individual judgment or market reputation, but be embedded into systems themselves.
The US approach remains more fragmented and assumption-based. Legal validity exists, but trust is largely mediated through disclosure, consent, and post hoc enforcement rather than common institutional scaffolding.
This contrast matters less for the specifics of any single technology than for what it reveals: two different answers to the same question – should trust be inferred by users, or provided by design?
Why These Differences Keep Producing Conflict
Because trust is defined differently, regulatory intentions are routinely misread. When Europe regulates platforms, it sees itself as defending systemic trust – in markets, in rights, in democratic processes. When the US responds, it often interprets the same actions as constraints on innovation and competition.
Neither side is irrational. They are operating with different models of how trust works, where it belongs, and who should be responsible for it. Until these underlying assumptions are acknowledged, transatlantic cooperation on digital governance will remain fragile – not because of technology, but because of philosophy.
Further Reading & Conceptual References
- Tocqueville, A. – Democracy in America (Individualism, association, and trust)
- Baier, A. – Trust and Antitrust (Goodwill-based trust)
- Hardin, R. – Trust and Trustworthiness (Encapsulated interest)
- Luhmann, N. – Trust and Power (Complexity reduction)
- Beetham, D. – The Legitimation of Power (Institutional justification and consent)
- Scharpf, F. W. – Governing in Europe(Input, throughput, and output legitimacy)
- European Commission – eIDAS Regulation & Digital Identity Framework
- Duffry, C. (CNN) – Trump administration’s vision of US tech dominance is colliding with Europe
- Bloomberg – US Threatens to Retaliate Against EU Firms Over Digital Tax
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace – Can Europe Trust the United States Again?
- EU Institute for Security Studies – Low trust: navigating transatlantic relations under Trump 2.0
